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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
  Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
KIMBERLY ROSE HYATT, 
 
  Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
No. 44490-2016 
 
Canyon County Case No.  
CR-2000-367 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Kimberly Rose Hyatt appeals from the district court’s order denying her 
Rule 35 motion in which Hyatt claimed her sentence is illegal because the district 
court conditioned its decision to retain jurisdiction on Hyatt’s placement in the 
therapeutic community.  
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Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
In 2012, Hyatt pled guilty to three counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance, and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 20 
years, with eight years fixed on each count, but retained jurisdiction.  (#41527 
R.1, pp.27-47.)  The district court’s judgment and order retaining jurisdiction 
included the following language:  “IT IS ORDERED if the defendant is not placed 
in the therapeutic community this Court shall be immediately notified as it will 
then relinquish jurisdiction.”  (#41527 R., p.47 (capitalization original, bold 
omitted).) 
Hyatt spent approximately ten months in the retained jurisdiction program, 
including the therapeutic community, after which the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction, and ordered Hyatt’s underlying sentences executed without 
reduction.  (#41527 R., pp. 63-65, 74-76; see R., p.68.)  Hyatt filed a Rule 35 
motion asking the court to “shorten[ ] the fixed portion of her sentence to allow 
further programming at the Department of Correction”; the district court denied 
the motion.  (#41527 R., pp. 66-67, 77-80.)  Hyatt timely appealed from the 
district court’s Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence, and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed.   (#41527 R., pp. 81-84; R., pp.6-7.)  The Remittitur in 
that appeal issued on July 7, 2014.  (R., p.8.)   
On June 7, 2016, Hyatt filed a second I.C.R. 35 motion.  (R., pp.9-16.)  In 
her second Rule 35 motion, Hyatt claimed her sentence is illegal because the 
                                            
1 The Court has entered an order augmenting the record in this appeal with the 
“Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Transcript” filed in Hyatt’s “prior appeal No. 
41527, State v. Hyatt (Canyon County No. CR-2012-15572).”  (R., p.106.) 
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court’s judgment of conviction required her to be “placed in the therapeutic 
community,” or the court would relinquish jurisdiction, which Hyatt claims is 
“illegal” because “forcing [her] to do [the therapeutic community] . . . constitutes 
forcing [her] to work unlawful, involuntary domestic insurrection against the 
United States without [her] knowledge or consent.”  (R., pp.10-11.)  Hyatt also 
claimed her sentence is illegal based on other allegedly unlawful aspects of the 
therapeutic community, including that it is “not authorized to be in the United 
States.”  (R., pp.11-14.)  The district court appointed counsel to represent Hyatt 
on her Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.35-36.)   
The state filed an objection to Hyatt’s motion and, despite having been 
appointed counsel, Hyatt filed a lengthy pro se response, as well as a motion for 
substitution of counsel.  (R., pp.38-65.)  Counsel, however, also filed a response 
to the state’s objection, in which he made a different argument than the one Hyatt 
asserted in her pro se motion.  (R., pp.66-67.)  Specifically, counsel argued that 
the district court lacked authority to include a condition in Hyatt’s judgment that, if 
Hyatt was not placed in the therapeutic community, the court would relinquish 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.66-67.)  Counsel further argued that “th[e] condition was not 
simply a recommendation, it effectively mandated placement into the program, 
[in] clear violation of” I.C. § 19-2601(4).  (R., p.67.)  The district court evaluated 
the motion as framed by Hyatt pro se, and as it was characterized by counsel, 
and denied it; the court also denied Hyatt’s request for substitution of 
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counsel.2  (R., pp.68-72.)  Hyatt filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.74-83.) 
   
                                            
2 The Honorable Molly Huskey was the presiding judge when judgment was 
entered, and when jurisdiction was relinquished; the Honorable Davis 
VanderVelde ruled on the Rule 35 motion that is the subject of this appeal.  (See 
R., pp.66-72.)   
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ISSUE 
 Hyatt states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Hyatt’s Rule 35(a) 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.)   
 
 
 The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
 
Has Hyatt failed to establish that conditioning the decision to retain 
jurisdiction on placement in the therapeutic community constitutes an illegal 
sentence?  Even if Hyatt’s illegal sentence claim had merit, has Hyatt failed to 
show she is entitled to any relief given that she was, in fact, placed in the 
therapeutic community?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Hyatt Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of Her Rule 35(a) 
Motion  
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Hyatt asserts that her sentence is illegal because, she claims, the 
provision in the judgment that conditioned the decision to retain jurisdiction on 
placement in the therapeutic community was unlawful because it “conflicted with 
the language of I.C. § 19-2601(4).”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  Hyatt’s claim is 
without merit because the district court has sole authority in determining whether 
to retain jurisdiction and conditioning that determination on placement in a 
particular program does not render the sentence illegal on its face.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “As a general matter, it is a question of law as to whether a sentence is 
illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion, and this Court exercises free review 
over questions of law.”  State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 
(2011) (citing State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009)).  
The proper interpretation of a statute is also a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review.  State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 P.3d 537, 
539 (2012). 
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C. The District Court’s Requirement That Hyatt Be Placed In The Therapeutic 
Community In Order To Receive The Benefit Of Retained Jurisdiction Did 
Not Make Hyatt’s Sentence Illegal 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) provides that a “court may correct a sentence 
that is illegal from the face of the record at any time.”  I.C.R. 35(a).  “[T]he term 
‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is 
illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of 
fact or require an evidentiary hearing.”  State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 85, 218 
P.3d 1143, 1146 (2009).  Nothing about Hyatt’s sentence is illegal.  
Upon Hyatt’s guilty pleas to three counts of delivery of a controlled 
substance, the district court imposed concurrent unified 20-year sentences, with 
eight years fixed.  Hyatt does not, and could not, claim that these sentences are 
illegal on their face.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief.)  Hyatt does, however, 
claim that her sentences are illegal because the district court conditioned its 
decision to retain jurisdiction on Hyatt’s placement “in the therapeutic 
community.”  (#41527 R., pp.46-47.)  Absent such placement, the court stated it 
would “relinquish jurisdiction.”  (#41527 R., p.47.)  There is nothing illegal about 
this condition.   
Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) authorizes a court to “[s]uspend the execution of 
the judgment at any time during the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a 
sentence to the custody of the state board of correction,” and retain jurisdiction.  
While the statute also provides that “placement of the prisoner” is the 
responsibility of “the state board of correction,” nothing in the plain language of 
the statute prevents a court from making a recommendation for placement, or 
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from conditioning its decision to retain jurisdiction on compliance with its 
recommendation for placement in a particular program.  See I.C. § 19-2601(4).  
Hyatt’s claim to the contrary is based on State v. Reese, 98 Idaho 347, 563 P.2d 
405 (1977).  Reese does not, however, support Hyatt’s illegal sentence 
argument. 
In Reese, the district court entered judgment imposing an indeterminate 
15-year sentence and, two days later, entered a “supplemental order which 
required that Reese be segregated from the general prison population and be 
held in the mental medical facility at the Idaho State Correctional Institution.”  98 
Idaho at 348, 563 P.2d at 406.  Reese appealed from the judgment and the state 
appealed from the supplemental order.  Id.  On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed Reese’s sentence, but reversed the supplemental order because the 
“order exceeded th[e] court’s authority.”  Id.  In doing so, the Court held that, 
while the district court’s recommendations regarding placement were “entitled to 
great weight,” the district court could not order such placement.  Id.  Rather, the 
Board of Correction is responsible for “the control, direction and management of 
the state penitentiary,” including “the Idaho security medical facility for mentally ill 
persons.”  Id.  “No allowance is made for the direct commitments by a trial court 
of a person convicted of a crime.”  Id. 
While Reese makes clear that a district court cannot order the Department 
of Correction to place any particular defendant in any specific program or facility, 
nothing in Reese, I.C. § 19-2601(4), or any other statute, prohibits a district court 
from recommending a particular program, or from conditioning its sentencing 
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decision on placement in a particular program.  Such a condition does not make 
a district court’s sentence illegal.  Hyatt has failed to show otherwise.   
Even if the district court’s condition for retaining jurisdiction rendered 
Hyatt’s sentence illegal on its face, Hyatt is not entitled to any relief.  Indeed, 
Hyatt acknowledges that, even in Reese, the defendant’s sentence was not 
illegal; only the supplemental order.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  Nevertheless, Hyatt 
“maintains [that] the order effectively mandating that she participate in the 
therapeutic community . . . makes her entire sentence illegal from the face of the 
record, and thus, should merit relief pursuant to Rule 35(a).”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.5.)  Hyatt, however, fails to articulate any reason why this is true, other than 
asserting that “the order effectively [and unlawfully] mandat[ed] that she 
participate in the therapeutic community.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  Beyond the 
fact that this statement is factually incorrect to the extent it was not a “mandate,” 
but only a condition for retaining jurisdiction, which Hyatt was free to refuse if she 
would have preferred prison, the statement ignores that Hyatt was accepted into 
and has already participated in the therapeutic community.  (See R., p.68.)  This 
Court has no power to change what has already occurred. 
Nor does Hyatt identify what “relief pursuant to Rule 35(a)” she believes 
she is entitled to receive.  (See Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  Instead, Hyatt asks this 
Court to “reverse the order denying her Rule 35(a) motion and remand this case 
for further proceedings.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  Exactly what the “further 
proceedings” would be is unclear.  Because Hyatt has failed to provide any 
argument or authority to support her request for relief, this Court should reject the 
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request.  See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) 
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting 
an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is lacking” and 
declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to “provide[] a single 
authority or legal proposition to support his argument”).   
Hyatt has failed to show the district court erred in denying her I.C.R. 35(a) 
illegal sentence claim.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Hyatt’s Rule 35 motion. 
 DATED this 24th day of April, 2017. 
 
     
 _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________ 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of April, 2017, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BRIAN R. DICKSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_______ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
